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Sliding Down the Slippery Slope of the
Sixth Amendment
ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETING PADILLA V.
KENTUCKY NARROWLY AND LIMITING THE
BURDEN IT PLACES ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
On October 4, 2002, a Kentucky state court entered final
judgment against Jose Padilla for certain charges related to the
transport of marijuana.1 Almost eight years later, that
commonplace occurrence2 resulted in the Supreme Court of the
United States reevaluating the Sixth Amendment rights afforded
to criminal defendants under the United States Constitution.3
The state court entered judgment against Mr. Padilla
after he pleaded guilty to “trafficking in more than five pounds
of marijuana, possession of marijuana, [and] possession of drug
paraphernalia.”4 Two years later, on August 18, 2004, Mr.
Padilla filed for postconviction relief, claiming that his attorney
had provided him with ineffective counsel by failing to advise
him of the possible removal consequences of entering a guilty
plea.5 According to Mr. Padilla, his attorney had been aware of
1

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2
In 2001 the Kentucky State Police made 6755 marijuana-related arrests.
Crime in Kentucky-2001, KY. ST. POLICE, http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/
pdf/crimefacts2001.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). In 2002 that number rose to
13,472. Crime in Kentucky-2002, KY. ST. POLICE, http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/
pdf/crimefacts2002.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
3
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473.
4
Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. In exchange for his plea, the fourth and related
charge of “operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number”
pending against Mr. Padilla was dismissed, and he was promised a ten-year sentence,
only five years of which were to be served. Id.
5
Id. The drug trafficking offense that Mr. Padilla was charged with is
deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time after
admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate)
any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a
controlled substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”).
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his status as a noncitizen, and had incorrectly advised him that
he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he
had been in the country so long.”6
Mr. Padilla’s motion for postconviction relief was
denied.7 After a series of appeals and reversals,8 the Supreme
Court of Kentucky ultimately found that because deportation is
a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is inapplicable where the
petitioner complains either of a failure to advise or of the
administration of incorrect advice regarding deportation.9 In
2009, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari on the matter.10
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court ultimately
held that the two-prong Strickland v. Washington11 test for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel did apply to Mr.
Padilla’s claim,12 and that under the Sixth Amendment, defense
“counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk
of deportation.”13 In finding that advice regarding the potential
immigration consequences of a guilty plea is the type of
information to which a defendant is entitled under the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel,14 the Court rejected the idea that
removal could be easily defined as “either a direct or a
collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction.15 In order to
fully appreciate the potential future impact of the Court’s
ruling on the criminal justice system, it is prudent to first
understand the jurisprudence regarding ineffective assistance
of counsel and the doctrine of collateral consequences.
Part I of this note will describe the state of the law
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and collateral
consequences of criminal conviction prior to Padilla. Part II
6

Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. Mr. Padilla was born in Honduras, but at the
time of the Supreme Court’s ruling he had lived in the United States for over forty
years as a legal permanent resident. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
7
Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
8
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Mr. Padilla’s
motion and remanded the case for a hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. The Commonwealth of Kentucky then appealed that decision. Id. at 483-84.
9
Id. at 485.
10
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
11
466 U.S. 668 (1984); see discussion infra Part I.A.
12
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
13
Id. at 1486.
14
In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment reads, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
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will analyze the Padilla decision and demonstrate how the
opinion opened the door for a slew of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims on many issues that had previously been
deemed collateral to criminal conviction. Part III will examine
how post-Padilla cases have interpreted the holding of the case
in relation to specific issues. This section will argue that some
lower courts have interpreted the decision too expansively and
in ways that will negatively affect the criminal justice system
and make the work of criminal defense attorneys much more
challenging. Finally, Part IV will discuss what criminal defense
attorneys can expect in a post-Padilla world and the steps they
should take in order to avoid claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Additionally, this section will ultimately advocate the
following positions: Padilla should not be applied retroactively;
the distinction between clear and unclear immigration law
should play a greater role in post-Padilla ineffective assistance
of counsel claims; it is the courts that should ensure that
defendants accepting guilty pleas have been advised of possible
removal consequences; defense counsel should be able to put
her client in contact with an immigration specialist in lieu of
providing immigration advice herself; and Padilla should be
read narrowly and should not be expanded to encompass other
consequences that have previously been understood as
collateral to criminal conviction.
I.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE LAW BEFORE PADILLA

As Padilla is best understood in the context of the doctrines
of ineffective assistance of counsel and collateral consequences of
criminal conviction, it is necessary to explore those doctrines before
analyzing the opinion and its future implications.
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence”16 is interpreted by the
Supreme Court as a guarantee of “‘the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’”17 The leading case discussing the
standards under which a defendant can successfully bring a
16

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (emphasis added)
(quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
17
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claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v.
Washington.18 The test set forth in Strickland has traditionally
been a very difficult one to satisfy.19 In Strickland, a defendant
who had pleaded guilty to a series of violent crimes, including
capital murder, petitioned the Florida state court to have his
conviction and death sentence overturned on the basis that his
attorney had provided ineffective assistance.20 The defendant
asserted that his counsel was ineffective in that he “failed to
move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a
psychiatric report, to investigate and present character
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to
present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to
investigate the medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine
the medical experts.”21 The requested relief was denied to the
defendant at both the trial and appellate levels.22
Defendant Strickland subsequently filed for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, again requesting relief on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.23 His request was
denied for the last time under the two-part test set forth by the
Court for the determination of claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel.24 The Court held that in order to make out a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show
“that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.”25 If the defendant can meet that standard,
he must then show that his attorney’s errors prejudiced him,
meaning that the actions, or inactions, “actually had an
adverse effect on the defense.”26
Throughout the Strickland opinion, the Court indicated
that the standard it articulated would be difficult for a
defendant to meet. For example, the Court stated,

18

See id. at 668; LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
(Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2008).
19
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an
easy task.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 693)); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to
Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 427 (1988) (“Strickland[] . . . creates an
almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance [of counsel].”).
20
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671.
21
Id. at 675.
22
Id. at 676-78.
23
Id. at 678.
24
See id. at 700-01.
25
Id. at 688.
26
Id. at 693.
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 284
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Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all
too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel
was unreasonable.27

Additionally, the Court remarked that “court[s] should
recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”28 Furthermore,
even if a defendant can satisfy the first prong of the Strickland
test by demonstrating that his attorney was in error, he must
then show that such error in fact prejudiced him.29 This task
seems trying, for “[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly
harmless . . . as they are to be prejudicial,” and “an act or
omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even
brilliant in another.”30 And indeed, in the more than twenty-five
years since Strickland was decided, it has been very difficult for
a defendant to make a showing sufficient for a court to rule in
his favor on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.31
A year after its Strickland opinion, the Court extended
the application of the Strickland test, which was formulated in
the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, to include the
evaluation of ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to
guilty pleas.32 In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court explained that as it
applies to guilty pleas, the first prong of the Strickland test “is
nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney
competence already set forth” in previous cases.33 This standard
was set forth in McMann v. Richardson, where the Court
stated that the validity of a guilty plea “depends . . . on
whether [counsel’s] advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”34 What falls within
this range “should be left to the good sense and discretion of
the trial [judges],” whose responsibility it is to “maintain

27

Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
29
Id. at 693.
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 18, at 284 (“[I]t is unlikely that a
defendant can win an ineffective assistance appeal unless his lawyer’s performance
was really awful.”).
32
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985).
33
Id. at 58-59.
34
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
28
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proper standards of performance by attorneys.”35 In merely
restating this reasonableness standard, Strickland does nothing
to clarify it, and actively rejects the idea that stringent guidelines
should be set dictating the conduct of defense counsel.36 Because
there are no clear rules for what does and does not pass the bar,
it has traditionally been very hard for a defendant to prove that
his attorney’s conduct was so lacking as to violate the first prong
of the Strickland test.37 Notably, in more recent cases, the Court
appears to have “taken a more robust approach to the
performance prong of the Strickland test.”38
Even if a defendant can prove that his counsel’s advice
regarding his guilty plea was so poor as to fall below this first
prong standard of competence, he must then go on to meet the
second prong of the Strickland test.39 As it applies to guilty
pleas, this “prejudice” prong of the test requires the defendant to
demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
35

Id. at 771.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (“Prevailing
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are
guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant.” (citation omitted)).
37
Calhoun, supra note 19, at 428 (“By adopting the amorphous ‘reasonable
attorney’ standard and adding language about the wide range of effective assistance
and the strong presumption favoring attorney competence, the Court has given lower
courts the power—without giving them adequate guidance—to interpret the allimportant right to effective assistance of counsel on an ad hoc basis in a climate often
hostile to defendants.”).
38
Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 394 (2009); see also
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (holding that under the 1982 ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, defense counsel did not make the requisite reasonable
efforts to examine the file regarding defendant’s prior conviction); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (holding that under the 1989 ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, defense counsel did
not sufficiently investigate for mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
396 (2000) (holding that under the 1980 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, defense
counsel had failed to conduct a proper investigation into the defendant’s past).
It may be important to note that Rompilla v. Beard, Wiggins v. Smith, and
Williams v. Taylor are all death penalty cases. It is possible that the Court only felt the
need to give the first prong of the Strickland test more teeth in these instances because
the defendants’ lives were at stake. However, this still seems to denote a remarkable
change in the Court’s ideas regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel standard, as
Strickland itself was a death penalty case. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
39
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). It is also noteworthy that in
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, the Court announced that courts may consider the two
prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel test in whichever order is easier for
them. If it is clear that the alleged action, or inaction, of counsel was of no prejudice to
the defendant, the effectiveness of counsel’s performance need never be ruled on. Id.
36
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insisted on going to trial.”40 This requirement serves the
“fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.”41 Undermining
finality is undesirable because it shakes “‘confidence in the
integrity of [court] procedures . . . and . . . inevitably delays and
impairs the orderly administration of justice.’”42 Because guilty
pleas, not trials, produce most criminal convictions, the greatest
negative impact on finality occurs when courts sanction new
bases for vacating such pleas.43 Additionally, courts should err on
the side of finality when they consider challenges to guilty pleas,
as these challenges do not often actually raise “‘the concern that
unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an
innocent defendant.’”44
When determining whether the defendant challenging
his guilty plea has met this second prong, courts will often have
to perform the same analysis that they would have had the
conviction been arrived at after a trial, instead of through a
plea of guilty.45 The Supreme Court illustrated this point with
the example of a defendant challenging his guilty plea on the
grounds that his counsel failed to “investigate or discover
potentially exculpatory evidence.”46 The Court explained that in
this situation, the outcome of the second prong of the
Strickland test will depend on the probability that “discovery of
the evidence would have led counsel to change his
recommendation as to the plea.”47 Furthermore, we are to
assume that counsel would only have changed his
recommendation if the discovered evidence would objectively
have been likely to change the outcome of the case at trial.48
B.

Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions

Another legal doctrine that was called into question by
the Court’s decision in Padilla is that of collateral
consequences of criminal convictions. The Supreme Court has
held that the validity of a guilty plea depends on “whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979)).
Id. (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784).
Id. (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784).
See id. (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784).
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59-60 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)).
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alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”49 In Brady
v. United States, the Court defined a voluntary guilty plea as
one “‘entered by [a defendant] fully aware of the direct
consequences.’”50 However, because Brady was not primarily
concerned with the possible consequences of conviction, the
Court did not elaborate on the meaning of “direct
consequences.”51 Direct consequences are currently defined as
those that have a “definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment”52 and include
sanctions such as “jail or prison time, probationary period or a
fine.”53 From the vague Brady definition of direct consequences
has evolved “the so-called ‘collateral consequences’ rule,” which
is a product of the lower state and federal courts, and states
that “an individual’s guilty plea is constitutionally valid even if
that person was unaware of his conviction’s ‘collateral’
consequences.”54 Consequences that at some time have been
deemed
collateral
include
“deportation,
sex-offender
registration, post-sentence involuntary civil commitment as a
‘sexually violent predator,’ the loss of voting rights, and the loss
of housing and employment opportunities.”55
Commentators critical of the collateral consequences
rule note that certain consequences that have traditionally
been deemed collateral, such as deportation, are now in fact the
direct result of conviction.56 For example, under the current law,
when a noncitizen is convicted of a crime categorized as an
aggravated felony, he will automatically and necessarily be
removed from the country, as there are no provisions for judicial
49

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962);
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927)).
50
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v.
United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on confession of
error on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
51
Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 685 (2008).
52
Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences,
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 n.15
(2009) (citing Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973)).
53
See id. at 124-25.
54
Id. at 124; see also Roberts, supra note 51, at 684-85.
55
Roberts, supra note 52, at 124 (citing, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781,
782-83 (5th Cir. 1975); Waddy v. David, 445 F.2d. 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971); Doe v. Weld, 954
F. Supp. 425, 438 (D. Mass. 1996)).
56
Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to
Know the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47,
47-48, 56-57 (2010); Maureen Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of
Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 47 (2010).
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discretion in this circumstance.57 Additionally, whereas in the
past immigration authorities were not necessarily notified when
a noncitizen was convicted of a crime that could lead to
deportation (and removal would therefore often take place years
after conviction or not at all),58 today there are systems in place
that ensure swift transitions between criminal proceedings,
immigration proceedings, and removal.59 Furthermore, some
criminal courts now engage in the practice of issuing removal
orders independent of any immigration authorities.60 When
considering the ways in which deportation has become closely
linked to criminal procedures and convictions, it becomes harder
to dismiss it as a merely collateral consequence.
The idea that deportation is a collateral consequence
has also been criticized on the basis that removal is often just
as, or even more, serious than the direct consequences of a
guilty plea.61 For example, when one member of a nuclear
family is removed, the rest of the family members must decide
whether to accept that they must live without the deported
person, or to leave their home, family, friends, and jobs, and
move to another country where they may have never been
before, may not speak the language, and may not have any of
the opportunities they had been accustomed to.62 Arguably, a
noncitizen defendant faced with such circumstances would only
plead guilty if he had no other choice.63 Often, when a
noncitizen does accept a guilty plea, he will agree to lengthier
terms of incarceration or parole, which are recognized as direct
consequences of criminal conviction, in exchange for a plea that
will not result in removal.64 This suggests that at least some
noncitizen defendants consider removal to be a more serious
consequence of a guilty plea than traditional punishments.65
While this does not bear on how direct a consequence

57

Sweeney, supra note 56, at 70 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006)).
Id. at 71 (citing Daley v. State, 487 A.2d 320, 322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)).
59
Id. (citing, e.g., Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Janet
Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.)).
60
Id. at 76.
61
See Cruz, supra note 56, at 62; Fernando Nuñez, Are Immigration
Consequences Really Collateral?, 34 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 323, 323 (2009); Roberts,
supra note 52, at 124-25; Sweeney, supra note 56, at 50.
62
Sweeney, supra note 56, at 51.
63
Nuñez, supra note 61, at 337.
64
Sweeney, supra note 56, at 50 (citing telephone calls and e-mails
exchanged with various federal public defenders).
65
Id. (citing same).
58
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deportation is,66 it does demonstrate that immigration
consequences are of the utmost importance to noncitizen
defendants and that such defendants would benefit from
receiving immigration advice before accepting a guilty plea.
II.

THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PADILLA V.
KENTUCKY

In Padilla, the Supreme Court examined the nexus
between an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the
doctrine of collateral consequences as it pertains to deportation
and held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to
notify her client when his guilty plea may make him subject to
deportation.67 The Court analyzed Mr. Padilla’s claim under the
Strickland test, holding that counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient under the first prong of the test, as it fell
below a standard of “‘reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.’”68 Although counsel in Mr. Padilla’s case
actually provided incorrect information, as opposed to no
information, regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty
plea,69 the Court expressly rejected the idea of limiting its holding
to “affirmative misadvice.”70 The Court did not rule on the second
prong of the Strickland test, leaving the determination of
prejudice for the Kentucky courts on remand.71 In ruling on the
66

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
68
Id. at 1482-83 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)); see also discussion supra Part I.A. (discussing the Strickland test).
69
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
70
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484. The Court gives two reasons for expanding its
holding to include omissions, instead of just misadvice. Id. First, limiting the holding
would encourage counsel to withhold available information from clients “fac[ing]
possible exile from this country and separation from their families.” Id. The second
reason the Court gives is that such a holding “would deny a class of clients least able to
represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is
readily available.” Id. However, it is unclear why a limited holding would actually
incentivize counsel to withhold available information from clients, unless of course she
believed that information she possessed was likely to be incorrect. It may be more
accurate to say that a limited holding would provide counsel no motivation to seek out
immigration advice for clients taking guilty pleas.
71
Id. at 1483-84. Although the Court ultimately did not rule on whether the
defendant had satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, it may be interesting to
consider whether knowledge of the correct information regarding the immigration
consequences of Mr. Padilla’s guilty plea would have changed counsel’s recommendation. In
order to determine this, under Hill, we should ask whether the fact that a guilty plea would
result in Mr. Padilla’s deportation would have changed the outcome of a trial. See Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). It most likely would not have, as his immigration status
was immaterial to the crimes of drug trafficking and operating a tractor-trailer without
proper documentation. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d
67
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effectiveness of Padilla’s counsel, the Court considered both the
ways in which immigration laws have gradually become more
oppressive in the United States (and how defense attorneys have
supposedly adapted their practices to account for these laws) and
the implications of deportation for noncitizen defendants.72 But
the Court overestimated how conscientious defense attorneys
have been in providing immigration advice and thereby opened
the door for a large number of ineffective counsel claims.
Additionally, by refusing to draw a line between direct and
collateral consequences, the Court invited ineffective counsel
claims based on other consequences that have traditionally been
considered collateral to criminal conviction.
A.

The Court’s Account of the History of Deportation in the
United States and of the Current Performance
Standards for Defense Counsel

The Padilla Court’s decision appears to be based on the
idea that immigration law has become too harsh in the United
States and the false assumption that criminal defense
attorneys have been modifying their practice to account for this
development.73 The Court traced the path of federal
immigration laws over the last ninety years, noting that while
the number of deportable offenses has grown considerably, the
discretion awarded to judges as to deportation has conversely

and remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). However, in Hill, the
Court also implied that where there is some circumstance or situation which is very
important to a particular defendant, the court should consider that knowledge regarding
this issue may have affected his decision to plead guilty. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. As Mr.
Padilla had been living in the United States for approximately forty years at the time of his
guilty plea, see supra note 6, it seems fair to consider his immigration status a very
important circumstance. And indeed, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Padilla did
allege that if he had been advised of the effects his guilty plea would have on his
immigration status, he would have gone to trial. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. Therefore, it
seems plausible that if the Supreme Court had not wanted to send a strong message to
criminal defense attorneys about their obligations to noncitizen defendants, it could have
found a violation of the second prong of the Strickland test, and focused more on that in its
opinion. Potentially, the Court could even have found that just as a court may dismiss an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim solely based on a prejudice prong assessment, see
supra note 39, a court may also grant such a claim based on a prejudice prong assessment.
Such a holding would have recognized the fact that even though an attorney’s conduct was
not objectively unreasonable under professional norms at the time it took place, it may still
have prejudiced the defendant. For an in-depth discussion of the interplay between Padilla
and the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, see Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, PostPadilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693 (2011).
72
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478-83.
73
See id. at 1478-80, 1482-83.
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shrunk to a point where it is almost nonexistent.74 It explained
that the passing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1917 marked the first time that noncitizens could be deported
based on offenses committed within the United States.75 The
Court noted that although this Act was quite an expansion in
immigration law, it did still include a “critically important
procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust
deportation.”76 The 1917 Act allowed the sentencing judge in a
criminal proceeding to recommend that a convicted noncitizen
be spared deportation.77 This veto power of sorts was called a
“judicial recommendation against deportation” (JRAD), and
was “‘consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing
judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular
conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.’”78
However, even though the number of deportable offenses
continued to expand, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act eliminated the JRAD as it applied to narcotics offenses,79
the 1990 Congress abolished it all together,80 and the 1996
Congress stripped the Attorney General of the power “to grant
discretionary relief from deportation.”81 As the Court views the
law today, “if a noncitizen has committed a removable
offense . . . his removal is practically inevitable.”82 According to
the Court, because of these gradual changes to the United
States’ immigration laws, “[t]he importance of accurate legal
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more
important,” as “deportation is . . . sometimes the most
important part of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”83
The Court stated that in light of these stringent
immigration laws, professional custom and practice has
evolved to “support[] the view that counsel must advise her
client regarding the risk of deportation.”84 It went on to
74

See id. at 1478.
Id. at 1478-79 (citing S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 55 (1950)).
76
Id. at 1479.
77
Id. (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 890).
78
Id. (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)).
79
Id. at 1480 (citing 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1), (4) (1994)).
80
Id. (citing 104 Stat. 5050 (1990)).
81
Id. (citing 110 Stat. 3009-596 (1996)).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 1482 (citing NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N,
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995); G. HERMAN,
PLEA BARGAINING § 3.03, 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel
75
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conclude that because the first prong of the Strickland test is
governed by “‘reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms,’” a defense attorney who fails to provide her client with
immigration advice regarding his guilty plea falls below what
is constitutionally required of her, especially where the
immigration law is clear.85 The Court rejected the notion that
requiring counsel to give such advice under Strickland would
have a vast impact on the finality of past guilty pleas.86 Instead,
the Court relied on the idea that defense attorneys had already
been imposing this requirement on themselves in order to
justify its expansive holding that defense counsel must not only
refrain from giving incorrect advice regarding the deportation
consequences of taking a guilty plea, but must take affirmative
action to provide her client available information on this topic.87
Here, the Padilla Court seems to have ignored the fact that
multiple courts have held that defense counsel’s failure to
provide immigration advice does not constitute an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and that for these cases to have
been decided, there must have been a considerable number of
defense attorneys who were not, and most likely still are not, in
the practice of providing their clients with advice regarding the
possible deportation consequences of their legal actions.88 The
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 713-18 (2002); A.
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 13:23, 555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 2 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEMS, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE, at D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
4-5.1(a), 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY
14-3.2(f), 116 (3d ed. 1999)).
85
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
Acknowledging that “[i]mmigration law can be complex, and . . . is a legal specialty of
its own,” the Court makes a distinction between the duties of defense counsel when an
immigration statute is clear as opposed to when it is unclear. Id. at 1483. In Mr.
Padilla’s case, the Court deemed the immigration statute at issue “succinct, clear, and
explicit in defining . . . removal consequences.” Id.; see also supra note 5 (providing the
text of the statute). Therefore, because “[t]he consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily
be determined from reading the removal statute, [and] his deportation was
presumptively mandatory,” his counsel should have given correct advice on the risk of
deportation, and failing to do so rendered his conduct constitutionally deficient.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. However, the Court allowed that “[w]hen the law is not
succinct and straightforward” defense counsel need only “advise a noncitizen client that
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Id.
But the Court failed to sufficiently explain what qualifies as “succinct and
straightforward” and what does not. See discussion infra Part III.B.
86
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
87
Id. at 1482-85.
88
See id. at 1481 (citing Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (5th
Cir. 2008); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
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Court thus opened the door for a potentially large number of
post-Padilla ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
B.

The Court’s Refusal to Classify Deportation as a Direct
or Collateral Consequence of Conviction

Before certiorari was granted, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky held that Mr. Padilla’s claim was not subject to the
protections of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel because immigration, as a collateral
issue, falls outside the scope of this protection.89 However, in
Padilla, the Supreme Court rejected this idea, stating that the
Court had never adopted the habit of distinguishing between
direct and collateral consequences when applying the
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.90 The Court
ultimately decided not to rule on whether immigration
consequences are direct or collateral to convictions, noting that
making such a judgment would be “uniquely difficult,” because of
deportation’s “close connection to the criminal process,” and
deeming such a distinction unnecessary “because of the unique
nature of deportation.”91 Instead, the Court relied on the fact that
while deportation is not a “criminal sanction” per se, it is
undeniably very much intertwined with the criminal justice
system.92 Additionally, the Court focused on the idea that
immigration laws have become so strict in recent years that
“removal [is now a] nearly automatic result for a broad class of
noncitizen offenders.”93 Therefore, because it may be very difficult
for these defendants to see the difference between their criminal
Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985); Oyekoya v. State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct.
Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa.
1989)); see also Cruz, supra note 56, at 64 & n.134 (commenting that “the reality of a
mandatory duty [to give immigration advice] raised some eyebrows amongst
practitioners” (citing Mark Bennett, Padilla v. Kentucky, DEFENDING PEOPLE: THE TAO
CRIMINAL DEFENSE TRIAL LAWYERING (Mar. 31, 2010, 8:38 PM),
OF
http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/2010/03/padilla-v-kentucky.html)). This blog notes
that prior to Padilla, in Texas, while “[t]horough and competent criminal-defense
lawyers would determine the immigration consequences and advise[] their clients of
them . . . not all criminal-defense lawyers are thorough and competent, and it’s much
easier to get the Padillas of the world to plead guilty if you gloss over those nasty
consequences.” Id.
89
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
90
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
91
Id. at 1481-82.
92
Id. at 1481.
93
Id.
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sentence and their resulting civil deportation, the criminal justice
system should not differentiate between the two either.94 Although
the Court refused to draw a line between direct and collateral
consequences, it did seem to adopt the arguments made by critics
of the collateral consequences doctrine.95 The Court essentially
ruled that because deportation is an immediate and serious
consequence of criminal conviction, a criminal defense attorney
should be required to provide immigration advice to a noncitizen
client contemplating a guilty plea, lest her assistance
subsequently be deemed ineffective.96 While this is certainly a
victory for noncitizen defendants, and a step toward well-rounded
advocacy, it does leave the door wide open for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims to succeed in regard to a number of
other consequences that have previously been deemed collateral.97
III.

LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF PADILLA

There are a number of questions that Padilla leaves
unanswered, which presumably could have been foreseen when
the decision was announced. For example, the Court did not make
explicit whether its decision was intended to be applied
retroactively, nor did it enunciate the standard that should be used
to distinguish between clear and unclear immigration laws.98 There
are also several issues that have presented themselves as the lower
courts have tried to apply the decision in Padilla that the Court
may not have anticipated. For example, in the wake of Padilla, it is
unclear whether a claim for postconviction relief will ever turn on
whether the judge taking a plea has advised the defendant of the
possible removal consequences of a guilty plea, without regard to
what the defendant’s counsel discussed with him;99 whether a
criminal defense attorney may direct her client to an independent
94

Id. at 1481-82 (citing INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001)).
See discussion supra Part I.B.
96
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
97
See discussion infra Part III.E (discussing a case in which the Court of
Appeals of Georgia held that failing to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would
result in his having to register as a sex offender satisfied the first prong of the Strickland
test and suggesting that the same result could easily be reached where counsel fails to
advise a defendant that pleading guilty will result in the loss of the right to vote).
98
See generally Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473.
99
See, e.g., United States v. Bhindar, No. 07 Cr 711-04 (LAP), 2010 WL
2633858 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, Nos. 1:07cr337
(LMB), 1:10cv618 (LMB), 2010 WL 2400006 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010); Ellington v. United
States, No. 09 Civ. 4539 (HB), 2010 WL 1631497 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010); Smith v. State,
697 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. 2010); State v. Romos, No. 09-0585, 2010 WL 2598630 (Iowa Ct. App.
June 30, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
95
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immigration specialist once she has recognized that his case
implicates immigration concerns;100 and whether courts will expand
Padilla to create ineffective assistance of counsel claims for other
consequences that have previously been deemed collateral.101
A.

Retroactivity

In setting forth the obligations that criminal defense
attorneys have to noncitizen defendants taking guilty pleas,
the Padilla Court left open the problematic question of whether
these constitutionally required standards should be applied
retroactively.102 The doctrine of retroactivity is generally
concerned with whether a new legal rule should be applied to
judicial decisions that came before the pronouncement of the
rule.103 The Supreme Court set forth its current doctrine on
retroactivity in its 1989 Teague v. Lane opinion,104 but the
doctrine is more clearly explained in the Court’s Whorton v.
Bockting decision.105 In Whorton, the Court explained that “an
old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new
rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct
review.”106 A new rule is one which “was not dictated by the
governing precedent existing at the time when respondent’s
conviction became final.”107 In order for a new rule to be
retroactively applicable in a collateral proceeding, it must be
either substantive, or “‘a watershed rul[e] of criminal
procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the criminal proceeding.”108 A substantive rule, as opposed to
a procedural rule, is one that puts “‘certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe.’”109 In other words, a
100

See, e.g., Grigorian v. United States, Nos. 09-22708-Cv-Martinez, 0560203-Cr-Martinez, 2010 WL 2889929 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2000), adopted by United
States v. Grigorian, No. 09-22708-CIV, 2010 WL 2884890 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2010);
People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
101
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
102
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473.
103
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIVE CASES AND COMMENTARY 16 (9th ed. 2010).
104
489 U.S. 288 (1989); Tom Cummins, Comment, Danforth v. Minnesota: The
Confrontation Clause, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 26869 (2009).
105
See 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
106
Id. at 416 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)).
107
Id. at 417.
108
Id. at 416 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
109
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
692 (1971)).
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substantive rule changes what is thought of as a crime. A
procedural rule can only be deemed watershed if it is
“necessary to prevent ‘an impermissibly large risk’ of an
inaccurate conviction,” and it “‘alter[s] our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding.’”110 Notably, it has been over two decades since
Teague was announced and the Court has not once applied a
new rule retroactively.111
In setting forth the obligations that criminal defense
attorneys have to noncitizen defendants taking guilty pleas in
Padilla, the Supreme Court left open the question of whether these
constitutionally required standards should be applied retroactively.
When the Supreme Court failed to rule on the issue of retroactivity,
that decision was pushed down to the lower courts. Although it
appears that a slight majority of lower courts has applied Padilla
retroactively, there are also several courts that have declined to do
so.112 In order to understand why it is ultimately more logical to
apply Padilla retroactively, it may be useful to examine two cases
that were heard in different counties within the same city, but
reached different conclusions on the matter.113
1. The Case for Retroactive Application: People v.
Bennett
In People v. Bennett, the Criminal Court for the City of
New York, Bronx County, decided that Padilla should be

110

Bockting, 549 U.S. at 418 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356

(2004)).
111

Cummins, supra note 104, at 269. The only rule that the Court has ever
deemed “watershed” was set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and
requires that counsel be appointed for all indigent defendants facing felony charges. Id.
at 339, 344-45.
112
Compare Luna v. United States, No. 10CV1659 JLS, 2010 WL 4868062
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010), and Martin v. U.S., No. 09-1387, 2010 WL 3463949 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2010), and United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010), and
Al Kokobani v. United States, Nos. 5:06-cr-207, 5:08-cv-177, 2010 WL 3941836
(E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010), and United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL
2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010), and United States v. Millan, Nos. 3:06cr458, 3:10cv165,
2010 WL 2557699 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2010), and People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2010), and People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (all holding
that Padilla is to be applied retroactively), with Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d
602 (E.D. Va. 2011), and United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033 (D.
Neb. Nov. 9, 2010), and United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349, 2010 WL 4134286
(D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010), and Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-4938, 2010 WL 2076020
(E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010), and People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010)
(all holding that Padilla is not to be applied retroactively).
113
See Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887; Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696.
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applied retroactively.114 Jermaine Bennett pleaded guilty to
criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree in
December 2005.115 He filed no direct appeals, but in November
2009, he collaterally attacked his conviction by filing a motion
to vacate the judgment against him on the basis that his
defense attorney had made “affirmative misrepresentations
and omissions of information concerning the immigration
consequences of [his] plea.”116 Because Mr. Bennett’s conviction
became final before Padilla was decided, the Bronx County
Criminal Court was forced to decide whether Padilla restated
an old rule, which would be applicable to Mr. Bennett’s case, or
a new rule, which would not be applicable to Mr. Bennett’s case
unless it was a substantive rule, or a watershed rule of
criminal procedure.117
There was no occasion for the Bronx County Court to
determine if the Padilla rule was substantive or watershed
because it found that the Supreme Court’s decision “did not
announce a new constitutional rule, but merely applied the
well-settled rule in Strickland to a particular set of facts.”118 In
its Bennett opinion, the Bronx County Court quoted Teague in
defining a new rule as one which “‘was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction
became final,’”119 and concluded that the Padilla Court had not
overruled precedent, but had simply “held that Strickland
applies to advice concerning deportation.”120 In finding that
Padilla simply articulates an old rule, the Bronx County Court
also relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Williams v.
Taylor: “merely applying Strickland to a new scenario does not
create a new rule, as ‘it can hardly be said that recognizing the
right to effective counsel breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States.’”121 In ruling this way, the Bronx
County Court also relied on its own inference that the Supreme
Court in Padilla intended for its decision to be applied
retroactively.122 The County Court reasoned that if this had not
114

Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 700. It is notable that Bennett was decided on
May 26, 2010, just two short months after Padilla came down from the Supreme Court.
115
Id. at 697.
116
Id.
117
See id. at 698-700; see supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the application of old and new constitutional rules).
118
Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
119
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).
120
Id. (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 n.12 (2010)).
121
Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).
122
Id. at 700.
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been the Supreme Court’s intention, it would not have felt the
need to comment that its decision “would [not] open the
‘floodgates’ of challenges to guilty pleas.”123
2. The Case against Retroactive Application: People v.
Kabre
In People v. Kabre, the Criminal Court for the City of New
York, New York County, reached the opposite conclusion from the
Bronx County Court, holding the Padilla rule to be inapplicable
retroactively on collateral review, at least as to misdemeanor
convictions.124 The Kabre Court faced a situation similar to that
which the Bennett Court had faced. Misdemeanor charges were
brought against a noncitizen defendant who pleaded guilty and
did not file a direct appeal, but subsequently collaterally attacked
his plea on the basis that his attorney had been ineffective in
failing to advise him, or incorrectly advising him, of the possible
immigration consequences of pleading guilty.125 However, unlike
the Bronx County Court, the New York County Court did not find
that Padilla merely restated an old rule, but rather that it set
forth “a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure.”126
Thereafter, the New York County Court reasoned that since such
new rules can only be taken advantage of on collateral attack
under certain conditions not satisfied in this case, Mr. Kabre’s
claims should simply be decided under the relevant New York
State law at the time that the attorney conduct took place, as it is
set forth in People v. Ford.127 Mr. Kabre’s attack on his attorney’s
effectiveness did not succeed under this standard, as Ford
specifically held that failing to advise of possible immigration
consequences does not constitute ineffective assistance, as
123

Id. (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485). The Supreme Court reasoned that
its decision would not “have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained
as the result of plea bargains” because “[f]or at least the past 15 years, professional
norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the
deportation consequences of a client’s plea.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. It is interesting
to note how many cases have since been brought alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel in regard to immigration advice and requiring lower courts to decide whether
Padilla applies retroactively. See supra note 112.
124
People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (2010). Although the Bronx County
Court in Bennett does not explicitly limit its holding to misdemeanor convictions, it is
notable that the contested plea in that case was to New York Penal Law section 221.10
(2), which is a class B misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (2) (McKinney 2008);
Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
125
See Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
126
See id. at 889.
127
Id. at 889-90; see People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995); see also supra notes 10311 and accompanying text (discussing the application of old and new constitutional rules).
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deportation is only a collateral consequence of criminal
conviction.128 The New York County Court wrote off any
indications that the Supreme Court believed Padilla would apply
retroactively on collateral attack, noting that whatever comments
the Court may have made, it of course intended for the Teague
test to be applied to the Padilla holding.129
In deciding whether to apply Padilla retroactively, the
New York County Court first examined the state of the law in
2005, when Mr. Kabre’s conviction was finalized.130 The New
York County Court stated that before Padilla, “the Supreme
Court had never held that [criminal] defense counsel . . . had
any . . . responsibility to advise an alien defendant of the
potential consequences of a conviction under the immigration
laws,” and that all the United States Courts of Appeals to be
confronted with this issue had found that deportation was “a
collateral consequence of [a guilty plea] and that defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise about
deportation or any other potential immigration consequence of
a criminal conviction.”131 The County Court then noted that
most state courts, including New York state courts, had
reached the same conclusion.132 Under New York law
128

Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 889, 901 (citing Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 404). It is
noteworthy that at the time of Mr. Kabre’s adjudication, New York law did require that
any immigration advice counsel chose to provide to her client be correct. See id. at 890
(citing People v. McDonald, 802 N.E.2d 131 (2003)). However, it is unclear whether Mr.
Kabre’s attorney gave him incorrect immigration advice or no advice at all. Id.
129
See id. at 897-98; see supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the Teague retroactivity standard).
130
See Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 892-95.
131
Id. at 892-93 (citing Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d
20 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell,
778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973)).
132
See id. at 893-94 (citing Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995); Christie v. State, 655 A.2d 306 (Del. 1994); State v. Ginebra, 511 So. 2d
960 (Fla. 1987); People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1991); State v. Ramirez, 636
N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 2001); State v. Muriithi, 46 P.3d 1145 (Kan. 2002); Commonwealth
v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106 (La.
2002); People v. Davidovich, 606 N.W.2d 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d 618 N.W.2d
579 (Mich. 2000); Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998); State v. Zarate, 651
N.W.2d 215 (Neb. 2002); Barajas v. State, 991 P.2d 474 (Nev. 1999); State v. Dalman,
520 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1994); People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989); Nikolaev v. Weber, 705 N.W.2d 72
(S.D. 2005); Bautista v. State, 160 S.W.3d 917 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Perez v. State,
31 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 125 P.3d 930 (Utah
2005); State v. Martinez-Lazo, 999 P.2d 1275 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Santos,
401 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
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specifically, in 2005, counsel could be deemed ineffective for
providing a client with incorrect advice regarding collateral
consequences of a plea,133 but could avoid the issue altogether by
remaining silent on collateral issues.134 In Padilla, the Supreme
Court actually adopted an approach taken only by a few states
which had previously refused to recognize a strict divide
between direct and collateral consequences on the basis that
deportation is so harsh a sanction.135
After setting out the state of the law, the New York
County Court then employed three different tests previously
set forth by the Supreme Court in order to come to its
conclusion that the Padilla decision created a new rule.136 First,
the County Court asked whether the Supreme Court’s Padilla
decision was “‘dictated’ by precedent.”137 Observing that in 2005
neither the Supreme Court, nor the federal circuit courts, nor
the majority of the state courts, nor the New York state courts,
had held that “counsel’s failure to apprise a defendant of the
immigration consequences of a plea [constituted] ineffective
assistance or that the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences was [irrelevant] to [a claim of] [in]effective
assistance of counsel,” the New York County Court concluded
that the Padilla decision was not required by any previous
decision.138 Second, the New York County Court analyzed the
question by asking whether the Supreme Court’s decision
“overruled past authority,” noting that “a decision which
overrules a prior case is obviously a new rule.”139 Although
Padilla did not overrule Supreme Court precedent, as there was
133

Id. at 895 (citing McDonald, 802 N.E.2d 131).
Id. at 894-95 (citing Ford, 657 N.E.2d at 267).
See id. at 894 (citing Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994);
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004)). The New York County Court also notes that
there are a few other courts that have used other lines of reasoning when considering
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the immigration effects of guilty pleas. Id. at
894 n.5. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that “if counsel ha[s] reason
to believe that a defendant [is] an alien there [is] a duty to investigate the immigration
consequences of a conviction.” Id. (citing People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Co. 1987)).
Although the California Supreme Court has had an opportunity to rule on whether failing
to advise a criminal defendant of the immigration effects of a plea constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, it has chosen not to do so, holding only “that the ‘collateral’ nature
of such ramifications d[oes] not foreclose an ineffective assistance claim.” Id. (citing In re
Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2001)).
136
See id. at 895-98.
137
Id. at 895 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989); Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); People v.
Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 1995)).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 896 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990)).
134
135
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none on point, it did in effect overrule the opinions of all the
federal circuit courts that had confronted the issue, and of the
majority of the state courts.140 In this way, Padilla “certainly
has . . . established a new rule in those jurisdictions.”141 The last
test under which the New York County Court analyzed whether
Padilla sets forth a new rule asks whether “the ‘unlawfulness of
[defendant]’s conviction was apparent to all reasonable
jurists.’”142 The court reasoned that any such unlawfulness would
certainly not be obvious, seeing as the majority of the federal
circuit courts and state courts had previously found that
petitioners similarly situated to Mr. Padilla had no valid claims
for ineffective assistance of counsel.143 Based on these three
findings, the New York County Court then concluded that
Padilla did in fact set forth a new constitutional rule.144
After deciding that Padilla set forth a new rule, the
New York County Court explained why neither of the two new
rule exceptions set forth in Teague applied to the matter at
hand.145 The County Court first set forth that the only of the two
exceptions that the Padilla rule could possibly fit into is that of
the “‘watershed’ rules which alter a ‘bedrock procedural
element of criminal procedure which implicates the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.’”146 The New
York County Court then contrasted the Padilla rule with the
right to counsel rule that was established under Gideon v.
Wainwright, the only case to have ever been acknowledged as
establishing a “watershed” rule.147 The County Court stated
that the Padilla rule is simply “not as sweeping and

140

Id.; see also supra notes 88, 131-32 and accompanying text.
Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
142
Id. (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413 (2004)).
143
See id.
144
Id. at 897. In holding that Padilla set forth a new rule, the New York
County Court also took to tearing down the Bronx County Court’s reasoning about why
Padilla is merely a restatement of an old rule. Id. at 896-98. The New York County
Court rails hardest against the Bronx Court’s contention that “any holding expanding
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right under Strickland cannot be a new rule but is
necessarily an application of settled law . . . to new facts.” See id. at 896. The New York
County Court submits that the issue in Padilla “was not whether an alien defendant
has the same right to a competent lawyer as . . . a citizen defendant [does under
Strickland], but whether the scope of that representation extends to giving advice
about the [immigration] consequences of a conviction.” Id. at 897.
145
See id. at 892-900; see supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
146
Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12
(1989); People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 1995)).
147
Id. at 899 (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2008)); see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
141
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fundamental as that of Gideon.”148 When these rules are applied
to Mr. Kabre’s case, it is clear that while “[i]t is unconscionable
to convict and incarcerate a defendant who had no lawyer to
give advice about the legal process, present a defense, or argue
for leniency,” the same cannot be said about “deny[ing] a
hearing about what immigration advice was given six years ago
or more to a defendant who already had a substantial criminal
record and avoided incarceration by taking a plea.”149 Unable to
fit the new Padilla rule into one of the known new rule
exceptions, the New York County Court held that the rule was
not applicable to Mr. Kabre’s collateral attack of his conviction,
and that his claim should simply be evaluated under the laws
of New York as they existed at the time of conviction.150
3. Illogically, Lower Courts Rule in Favor of
Retroactivity
When deciding whether a rule should be applied
retroactively, the Teague analysis, for all practical purposes,
stops at whether a rule is to be considered old or new. This is
because the Court has never held a new rule to fall into either
of the two new rule exceptions, substantive or watershed
procedural rule, and to therefore be applicable retroactively.151
Therefore, it is important to focus on whether a holding simply
restates an old rule, or creates a new rule by stating a principle
not dictated by precedent, by overruling precedent, or by
stating some principle that was not clearly true to all courts
beforehand.152 Looking to the lower courts, it is clear that prior
to Padilla, it was not settled that criminal defense attorneys
had an affirmative obligation under the Constitution to provide
immigration advice to their clients taking plea bargains.153
Before this decision, most courts found immigration to be wholly
collateral to a criminal conviction.154 Padilla has thus set forth a
new rule, which would not be applicable on collateral attack. The
strongest argument for deciding conversely that Padilla actually
reiterated an old rule, and can therefore be applied retroactively
148

Id.
Id. Mr. Kabre had six previous counterfeiting convictions. See id. at 890.
150
Id. at 900.
151
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
152
See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text (discussing three tests the
Supreme Court has used in the past to determine whether a rule should be considered “new”).
153
See supra notes 88, 131-32 and accompanying text.
154
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
149
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on collateral review, is the “floodgates” language in the Court’s
opinion which predicts it “unlikely that [Padilla] will have a
significant effect on those convictions already obtained as a
result of plea bargains.”155 However, the Court could simply be
suggesting that few Padilla claims will be brought on direct
review. In that case, we gain no insight about whether Padilla
articulated a new rule, which may be applied only on direct
review, or an old rule, which may be applied retroactively on
direct review or collateral review.156 Additionally, although the
Court did not explicitly express its opinion or rule on
retroactivity, a slight majority of lower courts have found that
Padilla is applicable on collateral attack.157
B.

Differentiating Between Clear and Unclear Immigration
Law

Another issue that the majority opinion in Padilla left
unresolved is the standard to be used to distinguish between
clear and unclear immigration laws.158 Surprisingly, this does
not now seem to be a topic occupying much of the time of the
various lower courts considering Padilla-based ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.159 One example of a case in which
this distinction does do work is People v. Cristache, in which
the defendant originally pleaded guilty to several charges in
the Queens Misdemeanor Treatment Court of the City of New
York (QMTC), based on the promise that if he completed a drug
treatment program, his pleas would be vacated and his cases
dismissed and sealed.160 After leaving the treatment program
several times, and being re-arrested several times as well, Mr.

155

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text (discussing the application
of old and new constitutional rules).
157
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
158
See supra note 85.
159
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court . . . holds
that a criminal defense attorney must provide advice in th[e] specialized area [of
immigration] in those cases in which the law is ‘succinct and straightforward’—but not,
perhaps, in other situations. This vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and
needless litigation.” (citation omitted)). One explanation for why state courts have shied
away from distinguishing clear from unclear immigration laws is that they simply do not
have the ability to do so. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, When State Courts
Meet Padilla: A Concerted Effort Is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on CrimeBased Immigration Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299, 311 (2011) (stating that
“state courts . . . are not sufficiently familiar with immigration law to determine when
deportation will clearly result from pleading guilty to a particular offense”).
160
People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834-36 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010).
156
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Cristache was eventually sentenced to several months in jail.161
Two months after his sentencing, Mr. Cristache moved to have
his pleas vacated under Padilla on the basis that his defense
attorney had not informed him of the potential immigration
consequences of his guilty pleas.162
In this case, whether defense counsel’s advice was effective
under Strickland turned on whether the immigration law
surrounding Mr. Cristache’s guilty pleas was clear or unclear.163
The Cristache Court determined that although the defendant had
pleaded guilty to crimes that qualified as removable offenses, they
were not of the sort “which would have clearly subjected him to
‘automatic’ or ‘mandatory’ removal or deportation,” as they would
not be classified as “aggravated felon[ies].”164 Therefore, the
Cristache Court reasoned that here, “where the removal
‘consequences of [defendant’s] . . . plea[s] . . . [were] unclear or
uncertain,’” defense counsel was required to “‘do no more than
advise [defendant] that pending criminal charges may carry a risk
of adverse immigration consequences.’”165 The Cristache Court
found that defense counsel in this case did in fact do enough to
satisfy the Padilla rule by advising defendant that “he would have
a criminal record . . . and he would have immigration
consequences,” if he did not complete his court-mandated drug
treatment program.166 While it would have been more favorable for
defense counsel to have expounded upon this advice, ultimately she
gave enough advice so that her conduct was not “constitutionally
deficient under the performance prong of Strickland.”167
The Cristache Court demonstrated how the distinction
between clear and unclear immigration laws can be used to
limit how many of the numerous ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that have arisen since Padilla was announced
will succeed. Although few post-Padilla courts have used this
161

Id. at 836.
Id. at 836-37.
163
See id. at 842-46.
164
Id. at 842-43 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii);
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001); Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162, 167 (2d
Cir. 2007); People v. Argueta, 46 A.D.3d 46, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)).
165
Id. at 843 (alterations in original) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1483 (2010)).
166
Id. Although Mr. Cristache actually alleged that defense counsel gave him
no advice at all regarding the possible immigration consequences of his pleas, the
Cristache Court credited defense counsel’s contention that indeed she did. Id.
For the argument that the Cristache Court misinterpreted the immigration
law, and that Mr. Cristache’s conviction actually “clearly subjected him to removal,”
see Hernández, supra note 159, at 319-22.
167
Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
162
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distinction as the basis for their decisions, it would prove a
useful tool if more liberally employed.
C.

The Role of the Judge in Post-Padilla Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims

Although a claim of ineffective counsel brought under
Strickland (and under Padilla when such claim is specifically
regarding a failure to give immigration advice in relation to a
guilty plea) normally focuses on the actions or inaction of
defense counsel,168 the presiding court’s actions are also
relevant.169 In fact, several post-Padilla decisions in the lower
courts have stated that where the court advised the defendant
of the potential immigration consequences of his plea during
the plea allocution, the defendant cannot satisfy the second
“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test.170 This seems to be a
logical conclusion considering that the prejudice prong can only
be satisfied for guilty pleas where, if not for defense counsel’s
errors, the defendant would have decided to go to trial.171 It
would be illogical for a defendant bringing an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim to allege that he would have
withdrawn his decision to plead guilty if only the words spoken
to him by the court during his plea allocution had instead been
uttered by his defense attorney. However, a few courts have
nonetheless held that a defendant may succeed with such a
claim regardless of the warnings given by the court.172

168

See discussion of Strickland supra Part I.A; see discussion of Padilla supra

Part II.
169

See, e.g., United States v. Bhindar, No. 07Cr711-04, 2010 WL 2633858, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010); United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, No. 1:07cr337, 1:10cv618,
2010 WL 2400006, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010), aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 404 F.
App’x 714 (4th Cir. 2010); Ellington v. United States, No. 09CIV4539, 2010 WL 1631497,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010); Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218, 218-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010); People v. DeJesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
24, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 405-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
170
Bhindar, 2010 WL 2633858, at *6; Ellington, 2010 WL 1631497, at *3;
Flores, 57 So. 3d at 218-21.
171
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
172
See DeJesus, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12; Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 405-07.
It is unclear whether it is significant that both of these cases were decided in New York
State courts (one in Kings County and one in New York County). It is possible that
New York State courts are more sympathetic to defendants bringing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims under Padilla than are the federal courts, or the courts of
other states. However, it is also possible that New York State, especially New York
City, simply deals with a greater quantity of such claims, and this just happens to be
how these two specific cases came out. It is also important to note that New York City
has not been so liberal in regard to all aspects of claims brought under Padilla. For
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1. If the Defendant Was on Notice, He Cannot Prove
Prejudice
Among the courts that have explicitly noted that a
court’s warning regarding immigration consequences is enough
to defeat a Strickland claim under the prejudice prong are the
Southern District of New York and the District Court of Appeal
of Florida.173 In Ellington v. United States, the Southern District
found that where the judge who took the plea allocution asked
the defendant, “Do you recognize that your plea of
guilty . . . may affect your ability to remain within the United
States?” and the defendant replied, “Yes,” it was irrelevant
whether defense counsel had informed the defendant of the
possible deportation consequences of entering a plea.174 This
was because the judge had “explained the issue in open
court.”175 In United States v. Bhindar, the Southern District
reiterated this principle, stating that the defendant “would be
hard-pressed to show that the ineffective assistance of counsel
prejudiced his defense” where he had verbally indicated his
understanding after the judge taking his plea told him, “[O]ne
of the consequences of your plea, if you are not a citizen of the
United States is that, at the conclusion of your sentence, you
will be removed from the United States.”176 The court ruled this
way despite the fact that the defendant was not claiming that
his counsel had failed to advise him, but that he had actually
given him misinformation.177 This was because the court’s
warning had put the defendant on notice that there would in
fact be immigration consequences from entering a plea of
guilty, regardless of what his attorney had previously told
him.178 In Flores v. State, the District Court of Appeal of Florida
held that an ineffective assistance claim would fail under the
second prong of Strickland where the court gave correct
immigration advice during the plea colloquy, even though
defense counsel had previously given incorrect immigration
advice that the defendant thought safe to follow.179 In this case,
example, Part III.A.2 discusses a New York County case in which the court decided
that Padilla should not apply retroactively.
173
See Bhindar, 2010 WL 2633858, at *6; Ellington, 2010 WL 1631497, at *3;
Flores, 57 So. 3d at 218-21.
174
Ellington, 2010 WL 1631497, at *3.
175
Id.
176
Bhindar, 2010 WL 2633858, at *5-6.
177
Id. at *3-5.
178
Id. at *6 (citing Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2007)).
179
Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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the court relied mainly on the principle that the defendant had
sworn during his plea that he understood the court’s warning,
and should not later be allowed to change his answer.180
2. But, the Defendant May Have Been Prejudiced if He
Did Not Understand the Court’s Warning
In contrast to the opinions of the Southern District of
New York and the District Court of Appeal of Florida, the
branches of the New York Supreme Court sitting in the
Counties of Kings and New York have found that ineffective
assistance claims may succeed even where the court warned
the defendant of the possible immigration consequences of his
plea.181 In People v. Garcia, the New York Supreme Court for
the County of Kings specifically rejected the Southern District’s
Bhindar holding, instead ruling that when a defendant has
been misled by advice, or has not been given any advice,
regarding the immigration consequences of entering a guilty
plea, “the Court’s general warning will not automatically cure
counsel’s failure nor erase the consequent prejudice.”182 Rather,
a defendant in such a situation might still be able to succeed
with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, as Mr. Garcia
did.183 Additionally, in People v. DeJesus, the New York
Supreme Court for the County of New York held that where a
defendant alleges that his attorney did not advise him of the
deportation effects of his plea, that he did not understand the
warning given by the court, and that he believed he could rely
on his counsel’s advice to enter a plea of guilty, he may still be
able to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.184
3. Garcia and DeJesus Prejudice the System
The Garcia and DeJesus decisions are counterintuitive, if
not completely irrational. Although it is true that a Strickland
claim is supposed to address the conduct of counsel and not of the
court, it is far from clear how a defendant can remain prejudiced
under the second Strickland prong by the lack of information or
180

Flores, 57 So. 3d at 220 (citing Iacono v. State, 930 So. 2d 829 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006)).
181
See People v. DeJesus, No. 10335/98, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 24, 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 406-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
182
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
183
Id. at 407.
184
DeJesus, 2010 WL 5300535, at *11-12.
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misinformation supplied by counsel, after he is given correct
information by the court. This is particularly hard to understand if
it is assumed that anyone facing charges before a court knows that
an attorney is present to provide assistance, but that the judge
makes the final decisions. Additionally, decisions such as these
leave the courts without a way to limit the number of claims for
ineffective assistance of counsel brought under Padilla. Although
courts could not possibly possess the resources to watch over every
interaction between counsel and defendant, making sure the
proper advice regarding guilty pleas and immigration is given,185
they do have the ability to ask the defendant in open court during a
plea colloquy whether the defendant was advised of the fact that
his plea may result in deportation. If the court cannot rely on the
defendant’s answer to such a question, it is unclear how else a
court could ensure that proper advice was given.
D.

Determining When a Criminal Defense Attorney May
Defer to an Immigration Specialist

In Padilla, the Court acknowledged that immigration law
is a complex subject in its own right, and consequently limited the
extent of the advice that is required when the pertinent
immigration law is unclear.186 However, even where the law
appears clear, a criminal defense attorney might think it
provident to consult with an immigration specialist before
advising her client on the possible immigration ramifications of
accepting a guilty plea, or perhaps to simply refer her client to
such a specialist. By analyzing two cases that have emerged from
this type of attorney conduct, it becomes clear that while a
defense attorney may engage an immigration specialist to further
assist her client, she does not satisfy her duty under Padilla by
pleading ignorance of immigration law and telling her client to
seek counsel elsewhere on that issue.187 In cases such as these, it is
important to focus on three questions: whether the criminal
defense attorney has given any immigration advice at all;
whether she actually facilitated contact with an immigration
185

The author is ignoring the confidentiality and privilege issues which would
obviously be implicated if courts were to watch over the interactions between attorney
and client, in order to make a point.
186
See supra note 85.
187
See Grigorian v. United States, Nos. 09-22708-Cv-Martinez, 05-60203-CrMartinez, 2010 WL 2889929 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2010), adopted by United States v.
Grigorian, No. 09-22708-CIV, 2010 WL 2884890 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 2010); Garcia, 907
N.Y.S.2d 398.
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counselor, as opposed to just suggesting it; and whether the
advice given by the immigration specialist was correct.
1. A Defense Attorney May Enlist the Assistance of an
Immigration Specialist
In Grigorian v. United States, the Southern District of
Florida held that Mr. Grigorian had not been deprived of
effective assistance of counsel where his criminal defense
attorney warned him that he would be deported if he accepted a
guilty plea, and the immigration specialist whom his defense
attorney recommended he consult, in contrast, advised him to
take a plea, as going to trial would likely lead to conviction and
serious immigration consequences.188 Mr. Grigorian argued
essentially that his defense attorney had made the possibility of
deportation upon acceptance of a guilty plea sound too definite,
and that if he had known he would have been entitled to a
deportation proceeding where he could argue the case for letting
him remain in the United States, he would have pleaded guilty.189
The court found that Mr. Grigorian had in fact received enough
information regarding the potential immigration consequences of
going to trial, and of pleading guilty, and that his defense counsel
had thus not been deficient in his performance.190
2. A Defense Attorney May Not Abdicate Her Duties to
an Immigration Specialist
The New York Supreme Court for the County of Kings
has also ruled on a Padilla ineffective assistance of counsel
claim involving an independent immigration specialist.191 In
People v. Garcia, the New York Supreme Court held that the
Padilla standard is not met, and counsel’s performance is
188

See Grigorian, 2010 WL 2889929, at *3-4, *7. It is noteworthy that Mr.
Grigorian did not actually plead guilty, but rather proceeded to trial and was convicted
of an aggravated felony, subjecting him to deportation. See id. at *1, *4. While the facts
of this case are different from those of Padilla, in that Mr. Padilla accepted a guilty
plea, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, the case still deals with the duty of the
criminal defense attorney when counseling her client on the choice between a plea and
a trial. Grigorian, 2010 WL 2889929, at *6.
189
See Grigorian, 2010 WL 2889929, at *3. While Mr. Grigorian contends that
he would have pleaded guilty, presumably to a lesser offense, had he known that he
would be entitled to an immigration proceeding, this is of no consequence because
despite his defense attorney’s efforts, the government never offered him a plea bargain
to anything less than an aggravated felony. See id. at *3-4.
190
Id. at *6-7.
191
See Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
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therefore deficient, where a criminal defense attorney tells her
client that she has no knowledge of the immigration law and
that he should seek independent advice; the client does seek
advice; and he receives incorrect information.192 Upon being
informed by his defense attorney that he would have to inquire
elsewhere as to the immigration consequences of taking a guilty
plea, Mr. Garcia sought the advice of the only immigration
professional whose assistance he could afford: a paralegal.193 This
person incorrectly advised Mr. Garcia that pleading guilty to a
single misdemeanor would not result in any negative
immigration effects, and Mr. Garcia subsequently accepted a
plea of guilty to one misdemeanor count of drug possession.194
3. Grigorian and Garcia: Elucidating the Proper Role of
the Immigration Specialist in the Criminal Proceeding
When viewed together, Grigorian and Garcia present an
idea of the different types of scenarios that may arise when a
criminal defense attorney recommends her client seek the advice
of an experienced immigration attorney. Grigorian suggests that
it is proper for a defense attorney to direct her client to an
immigration expert for additional counseling, where she has
already provided him with limited, yet sufficient, advice on the
possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Garcia
reinforces the idea that a defense attorney must directly provide
some immigration advice in order to meet the Padilla standard.
Additionally, Garcia suggests that where a client is referred to
an independent specialist by his defense attorney, the defense
attorney must actually facilitate the contact with the specialist,
and may be responsible if the specialist provides incorrect
advice. However, these two cases are rather fact-specific and
their holdings do not necessarily offer much assistance in
determining the proper role of the independent immigration
specialist in criminal defense cases in general.
192

Id. at 405. Notably, the New York Supreme Court did ultimately grant Mr.
Garcia’s motion to vacate his plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at
407. In addition to counsel’s performance being deficient, the court also found that Mr.
Garcia had met the burden of proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Id. at
406-07. The court reasoned that if Mr. Garcia was so worried about the immigration
consequences of his plea that he felt the need to ask his defense attorney about them,
and seek assistance elsewhere when his attorney could not assist him, he would not
have pleaded guilty had he been properly informed that entering a guilty plea would
result in deportation. Id. at 406.
193
Id. at 400.
194
Id. at 399-400.
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For example, Grigorian and Garcia would not provide
much guidance in a situation where a criminal defense
attorney failed to personally provide immigration advice, but
ensured that her client had unhampered access to a reputable
immigration attorney, who ultimately provided correct advice.
Nor do these cases evince a standard for a case where defense
counsel gave limited but sufficient advice, but also provided her
client access to a more experienced immigration attorney, who
subsequently gave the client incorrect advice. In the first
hypothetical situation, it would be preposterous to deem the
criminal defense attorney’s conduct ineffective simply because
she was not the direct source of the relevant and correct
immigration advice. In the second situation, the proper
outcome of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against
the defense attorney seems less clear, as the misadvised client
should certainly have some recourse after being given incorrect
information. However, it would ultimately be ridiculous to hold
the defense attorney’s performance ineffective, as it would be
illogical to require a criminal defense attorney to know that an
immigration attorney’s advice is incorrect, as a defense attorney
would only seek out an immigration attorney precisely because
she has limited knowledge of the subject area. It could hardly be
argued that defense counsel would fall below professional
standards of conduct by providing her client access to an
immigration specialist, even where the immigration attorney’s
advice ends up being incorrect.195 The proper role of a criminal
defense attorney representing a noncitizen should be to facilitate
contact between her client and an attorney who is well versed in
immigration law.196 There is no reason that a defense attorney
should be required to provide immigration advice first hand, and
it would be unfair to hold a defense attorney responsible for the
errors of an immigration specialist.197
195

Although this situation would not meet the first prong of the Strickland
test, it would certainly seem to prejudice the defendant involved. This calls attention to
the idea that the Strickland test may fail where behavior that does not qualify as
deficient under the first prong of the test creates a situation that would meet the
second prejudice prong. See supra note 71.
196
For more ideas on the best practices for representing noncitizens in criminal
proceedings, see Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts
on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 366-69 (2011) (“The
greatest likelihood of successful representation of noncitizen clients is with the collaboration
of all those partners currently engaged in the various fields . . . .”).
197
It is true that when a defendant files a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel requesting that his plea or conviction be reversed he is not making a case aimed
at holding his attorney responsible. However, if a defendant can make out a claim for
ineffective assistance under Strickland, see discussion supra Part I.A, for a violation of his
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Expanding Padilla

When the Padilla Court decided that a criminal defense
attorney must advise her noncitizen client of the potential
immigration effects of a plea bargain,198 despite the fact that
deportation has traditionally been considered a collateral effect
by lower state and federal courts,199 it opened up the door to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on a lack of
advice or misadvice regarding other consequences that have
generally also been considered collateral. For example, several
courts have subsequently faced the question of whether to
extend the Padilla reasoning to the consequence of being
required to register as a sex offender.200 At least two courts have
held that ineffective assistance of counsel will be found where
plea counsel fails to advise her client that his guilty plea will
result in his having to register as a sex offender.201
In order to support such a holding regarding sex
offender registration, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Taylor v.
State relied on the factors it believed the Supreme Court used
to support its holding regarding deportation.202 Namely, the
rights under Padilla, see discussion supra Part II, he will most likely also be able to make
out a tort claim for legal malpractice under a theory of negligence. To prove such a
malpractice claim, the proponent of the suit has to show that the lawyer in question owed
him a duty, “that the lawyer failed to exercise the competence and diligence normally
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances,” and that the lawyer’s failures caused him
actual harm. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 18, at 129 (citations omitted). However, it is
notable that several jurisdictions require a defendant to additionally prove his innocence
in order to prevail on a criminal malpractice claim. See, e.g., Wiley v. Cnty. of San Diego,
19 Cal. 4th 532, 534 (1998); Schreiber v. Rowe, 814 So. 2d 396, 399-400 (Fla. 2002);
Rodriguez v. Neilsen, 609 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Neb. 2000); Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello,
Steen & Gordon, P.A., 727 A.2d 996, 999-1000 (N.H. 1999). Thus, it is possible that many
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty without proper immigration advice from their
attorneys will not ultimately be able to hold those attorneys civilly liable. Even so, an
attorney may always be held responsible for her actions, through sanctions and other
means, under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct propounded in the pertinent
jurisdiction. Where a criminal defense attorney does not provide the advice required
under Padilla, a defendant may report to the relevant bar association that his attorney
failed to provide him with competent representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
198
See discussion supra Part II.
199
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
200
See, e.g., Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896 DDN, 2010 WL 2680333, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. July 1, 2010); United States v. Rose, No. ACM 36508, 2010 WL 4068976,
at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2010); Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 385 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010); State in Interest of C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 2010 WL 2926541, at *1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 23, 2010).
201
See Rose, 2010 WL 4068976, at *4-5; Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388.
202
See Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 387-88.
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court of appeals endeavored to decide whether professional
custom and practice require advisement on sex offender
registration, whether this consequence is closely linked to the
criminal process, and whether it is comparably as serious as
deportation.203 The court of appeals relied on an ABA
publication in deciding that professional standards do require
advice regarding sex offender registration.204 As to the link
between conviction and registration, the court of appeals noted
that under Georgia law, registration is mandatory for certain
offenders, much the same way deportation is.205 Lastly, the
Georgia court found that being forced to register as a sex
offender is equally as severe a consequence as being deported
in that it is a life-long requirement which restricts a
registrant’s choices as to residence and profession, and
noncompliance with which is a felony.206
While none of these conclusions appears to be wholly
illogical, it is troubling that the same reasoning can be applied
to most other consequences that have traditionally been
deemed collateral.207 For example, a court could easily satisfy
these three factors in relation to the loss of voting rights.208
Holding that criminal defense attorneys are constitutionally
bound to advise of any consequences that are pointed out by
the ABA, that follow in some sense from conviction, and that
can be considered severe, would open up our already overtaxed
203

See id. at 388-89. Note the Padilla holding has also been interpreted as
based on two, as opposed to three, factors: close connection to criminal process and
severity. See Sixth Amendment—Effective Assistance of Counsel, 124 HARV. L. REV. 199,
206-07 (2010).
204
Taylor, 698 S.E.2d at 388 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PLEAS OF GUILTY, 14-3.2(f), cmt. (3d. ed. 1999)).
205
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(e)).
206
Id. at 388-89 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-12(n), 42-1-15).
207
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
208
As to the professional norms factor, the ABA publication which the Georgia
court cites advises that defense attorneys apprise their clients of all potential collateral
consequences before entering a plea of guilty. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999). With regard to the factor of how
closely related the loss of voting rights is to criminal conviction, approximately 5.3
million Americans are prevented from voting each year, simply by virtue of the fact
that they have been convicted of felonies. Voting Rights, SENT’G PROJECT, RES. & ADVOC.
FOR REFORM, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2011). Finally, with respect to the severity of being refused the right to vote, it is
undeniable that suffrage is a right that both black and female Americans of the past
fought a long time to win, and one that we find of the utmost importance as a democratic
society. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX; Hon. Anna Blackburne-Rigsby, Black Women
Judges: The Historical Journey of Black Women to the Nation’s Highest Courts, 53 HOW.
L.J. 645, 653-56 (2010); S. Brannon Latimer, Comment, Can Felon Disenfranchisement
Survive Under Modern Conceptions of Voting Rights?: Political Philosophy, State
Interests, and Scholarly Scorn, 59 SMU L. REV. 1841, 1841, 1843-44 (2006).
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court systems209 to innumerable new ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. One commentator estimates that each state
defines as many as several hundred consequences to criminal
conviction as collateral.210 In light of the easily satisfied factors
that Padilla leaves us with, there is no limit to the types of
advice we could potentially require criminal defense attorneys
to provide. For example, the Constitution might eventually be
interpreted to require that defense attorneys inform clients
that if they are convicted of certain crimes they will never be
able to adopt a child.211 This liberal expansion of the type of
advice that criminal defense attorneys are required to provide
leads us down a path where legal professionals who were trained
to navigate the criminal court system and negotiate plea deals
for lesser charges and lower sentences are instead acting as
therapists and life coaches, discussing with their clients all the
social repercussions of committing a crime. While it may be
admirable to try to provide a client with all the information that
could possibly be relevant to him, it is simply impractical in the
real world of limited financial and human resources.212 It is clear
that the Supreme Court has extended claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel to encompass failure to provide
immigration advice regarding guilty pleas, but lower federal and
state courts should not extend that holding any further.

209

Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 752 (2008) (noting that some federal and state court systems
are overburdened).
210
Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 686 (2011).
211
What Are the Requirements to Adopt a Baby?, LIVESTRONG.COM (MAY 20,
2010), http://www.livestrong.com/article/127624-requirements-adopt-baby/ (noting that
under federal law individuals convicted of “felony child abuse or neglect; violent crime;
spousal abuse; or a crime against children” may not adopt, and that individual states
may have additional restrictions).
212
See Sweeney, supra note 196, at 360-64 (discussing the resource challenges
that may be encountered when advising noncitizen criminal defendants).
It is noteworthy that the American Bar Association has accepted a contract
with the National Institute of Justice to perform a fifty-state survey of the collateral
consequences defined under each state’s laws. See Chin, supra note 210, at 685.
However, it is unclear when this undertaking will be completed, and whether funding
will be provided to keep the surveys current. If such surveys are completed and kept
current, it would then be much more reasonable to require criminal defense attorneys
to apprise their clients of collateral consequences of conviction. Still, it would always be
impractical to require an attorney to provide information on all possible consequences,
as they are extremely numerous. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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IV.

PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

What Criminal Defense Attorneys Should Expect in a
Post-Padilla World

In the wake of Padilla, not much is certain at the
intersection of criminal defense and immigration law. However,
it is clear that Padilla has produced an onslaught of new
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. When one of these
claims arises on collateral attack, a criminal defense attorney
may not be able to predict whether the presiding court will
apply Padilla retroactively. It does appear that a slight
majority of jurisdictions have ruled in favor of applying Padilla
retroactively.213 When a court considers a motion to vacate a
guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel under
Padilla, it is unlikely that they will draw a line between clear
and unclear immigration laws.214 Therefore, going forward, it
would be provident for defense attorneys to always give the
most extensive and accurate immigration advice possible when
dealing with noncitizen clients. If there is any chance that the
immigration law in question could be considered clear, a
defense attorney should research the issue and advise on it.
Criminal defense attorneys with little knowledge of
immigration law should still make their best efforts to advise
clients on whether accepting a guilty plea would result in
deportation. At that point, the attorney may want to enlist an
immigration specialist who can advise the client in more detail.215
However, where a defense attorney suggests such an
arrangement, she should take responsibility for facilitating contact
between the two parties, and realize that she may be held
accountable in a claim for ineffective assistance if the immigration
professional provides erroneous advice.216 Additionally, a defense
attorney would be wise to put on the record during her client’s plea
allocution that she did in fact discuss the particular immigration
consequences of the charged offense with her client.217 However,
she should not expect that a claim for ineffective assistance will
necessarily be undermined by the presiding judge advising the
client of the possible consequences of his plea during his

213
214
215
216
217

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
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allocution.218 Finally, a criminal defense attorney should be
prepared for the fact that after Padilla, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims may arise where she failed to provide advice on any
number of collateral consequences.219
B.

Recommendation: An Ideal Post-Padilla World

Although the previous section contains a summary of
what practitioners should expect in light of the way lower
courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s Padilla decision,
it is certainly not a summary of what would be best for our
criminal justice system. For example, Padilla should not be
applied retroactively because doing so would disturb the
finality of many pleas. This, in turn, would produce a massive
caseload in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
which would result in new trials that our overburdened system
is not equipped to handle. Additionally, when dealing with
Padilla-based ineffective assistance of counsel claims, courts
should make a practice of distinguishing between clear and
unclear immigration law, as this may prove a useful method for
weeding out meritless claims. Furthermore, ineffective
assistance claims should be immediately dismissed based on
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test where the record of
the plea colloquy indicates either that the presiding judge
asked the defendant whether his counsel had advised him of
the immigration consequences of his plea, and the defendant
answered in the affirmative, or that the judge herself informed
the defendant of the consequences. As a counter to the
argument that some defendants will not necessarily take the
judge’s advice over that already provided by their attorney, plea
colloquies should be lengthened so that the judge may explain in
depth the possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea and
also obtain a more detailed account of the advice that was given
by the defense attorney. This will certainly take up less time and
resources than conducting numerous new trials resulting from
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Additionally, when an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a defense
attorney’s failure to personally advise of the immigration
consequences of accepting a plea, it should be discounted if
defense counsel did in fact facilitate her client’s access to a
competent immigration attorney, even where that immigration
218
219

See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
See discussion supra Part III.E.
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attorney actually provided erroneous advice. Finally, the Padilla
holding should not be extended beyond immigration consequences
to other effects of conviction that have previously been deemed
collateral. Such an extension leads us down a road where we can
no longer recognize the role of the criminal defense attorney.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla v.
Kentucky was certainly a victory for noncitizen criminal
defendants, and was perhaps appropriate in light of the current
state of immigration law, its effects will only remain positive if
it is construed narrowly by the lower courts. Such a course of
action will respect the fact that immigration matters are
serious, and that deportation is a harsh consequence, without
overburdening court systems and criminal defense attorneys.
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